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Abstract
Can All Religions Live In Peace?
by
Antony Das S. Devadhasan
Adviser: Prof. Steven M. Cahn

Religion is identified as one of the main factors that divide humanity. Pluralists like, John
Hick identify the conflicting truth claims or the doctrines of different religions as the basis for
religious exclusivism. Hick accuses the exclusivists of being epistemically arrogant and morally
oppressive. His remedy for eradicating exclusivism is that every religion with conflicting truth
claims should reinterpret these claims so as to share an outlook with other religions.

Alvin Plantinga, a critic of Hick, contradicts Hick on behalf of a believer or an exclusivist.
He argues that for a believer his beliefs are true and all that are not in line with his beliefs are
wrong. According to Plantinga an exclusivist’s epistemic arrogance is justified as he/she is
epistemically favored by God. Furthermore Plantinga says that if the exclusivists are morally
oppressive pluralists are also for the same reason. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, another critic of
Hick, focuses her discussion on the gap between rationality and truth. The problem occurs when
we combine exclusivism of truth and inclusivism of rationality. She warns that doing so could lead
to agnosticism. However, she finds that Hick solves the problem in a sense when he acknowledges
that all religions are capable of communicating the divine to their respective believers, and all offer
ways to salvation. She also points out three possible dangers involved in Hick’s position, namely,
i) phenomenal polytheism and noumenal monotheism, ii) the threat to religious commitment and
iii

iii) the incompatibility of his position with many religions that consider seriously both historical
and transhistorical truths. Moreover, Zagzebski proposes that trust in one’s own belief is the
decisive factor in one’s religious convictions.

This essay aims to find a philosophical ground for the peaceful co-existence of religions.
To be different from others is our existential situation. A religion is different from other religions
based on its fundamental doctrines about the divine reality, which is incomprehensible or
unfathomable unlike any material object of scientific experiment. Hick’s Kantian analysis helps
us realize that all the knowledge we can have is only phenomenal. On that ground, no religion can
claim to be superior to all other religions. However, Hick’s conclusion that all religions must
modify their contradicting truth claims to be in line with other religions could be naive. Each
religion is superior to other religions from the perspective of its followers. However, peace among
religions is possible philosophically, especially as we are aware of our limitations in knowing the
truth, and we respect others as they also search for the same.
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Introduction
Is religion a dividing or unifying factor in the world? The following example demonstrates
how human beings, irrespective of all religious differences, long for peace. In May, during Pope
Francis’ visit to Palestine and Israel, the Pope invited both Shimon Peres, the president of Israel
and Mahmoud Abbas, the president of Palestine to go to the Vatican to pray for peace. They went
and joined the Pope in prayer on June 08th, 2014. The Pope encouraged them saying, ‘Prayer has
the ability to transform hearts and thus to transform history.’1 This story emphasizes that religion
remains a large part of our lives. Despite human achievements in the field of science, people still
turn to religions for answers to the ultimate questions in life.

Our society is divided in many ways, and religion is seen to be one of the main causes for
division. We are living in a multi socio-religious cultural world. Every person is unique and one’s
way of understanding the divine could be unique too, because spirituality does not deal with
material reality but transcendental reality. Though the divine reality is fundamentally one, our
beliefs could be different, since persons are not alike and each one understands the divine reality
from his/her background. Unlike belief, religion is based upon an agreement among a particular
group of people concerning their understanding of the divine and their response to the divine.
In this essay, we are concerned about the relevance and the challenges of religious
pluralism in the world today. Every religion has its own unique culture, belief systems, and world
views. All religions address the relationship among God, Man and World, but in their assessment,
they differ drastically, and each religion claims to be the best. Often times, their truth claims are

1

Cf., Pope hosts Mideast peace summit. New York Post. New York, Monday, June 9, 2014, 8.
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totally in contradiction to the truth claims of other religions. Given this situation, ‘Can all the
religions live in peace?’ is the question before us. We shall approach this issue beginning with an
analysis of the essay: “Religious Pluralism and Salvation” by John Hick a twentieth century ardent
advocate of religious pluralism, which is followed by the presentation of two opposing views of
Hick’s critiques, namely, Alvin Plantinga and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Finally, we shall
examine the possible philosophical basis for religious pluralism today.

A Life Sketch of John Hick
John Hick was a well known philosopher of religion and theologian who until his last
breath advocated the relevance of religious pluralism. He was one of the most important and
influential philosophers of religion in the second half of the twentieth century. He was born on
January 20th, 1922 in Scarborough, England and he did his MA at the University of Edinburg and
Ph.D. at Oriel College, Oxford University. Hick taught at Claremont Graduate University,
California from 1979 to 1992 as Danforth Professor of Philosophy of Religion. He also worked as
the H.G. Wood Professor of Theology as well as a Fellow of Research in the Arts and Social
Sciences at the University of Birmingham. Hick became the founder and the first chair of the group
All Faiths for One Race (AFFOR) and also worked as the chair on its Religious and Cultural Panel.
He died at the age of 90, on February 9th, 2012.

John Hick did not follow any religion in particular. His family background was such that
his grandmother and mother did not strictly follow any religion or go to a particular church
regularly; rather they seemed to have belonged to different churches. While Hick began as a law
student, he seemed to have undergone a religious experience which led him to accept evangelical
2

Christianity and to focus on the study of both theology and philosophy. In the early stages of his
interest in religion he defended Christian faith against the evidentialist criticism of logical
positivists, saying that Christian faith was not based on propositional evidence, but on religious
experience. During this stage he based himself on Irenaen ‘soul-making’ theodicy in which God
allowed evil and suffering in order to help the human beings to become mature so that they may
follow God’s will. But later in the 1960s, Hick seemed to have had another religious experience
while he worked on civil rights issues in Birmingham, alongside people of other faiths. There he
was convinced that sincere adherents of other faiths experience the Transcendent just as Christians
do, despite their cultural, historical and doctrinal differences. Such experiences and reflections led
him to develop the pluralistic hypothesis that ‘adherents of the major religious faiths experience
the ineffable Real through their varying culturally shaped lenses.’ Furthermore, he interpreted
Christian doctrines such as the incarnation, atonement, and trinity not as metaphysical claims but
as metaphorical or mythological ones.2

2

Cf., Cramer, David C. (2014). John Hick (1922-2012). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed
Academic Resource. Online resource: http://www.iep.utm.edu/hick/. Accessed on 07/07/2014.
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Chapter 1
A Critical Analysis of Hick’s article: Religious Pluralism and Salvation
Hick presents his article in six sections, and we shall also maintain the same structure in our
analysis. Each section begins with a short summary introduction which is followed by an analysis
further substantiated by references from other writings of Hick and others.

1.1.

Religions are the ways to salvation

In the world of religious pluralism, each religion with its distinctive beliefs, spiritual practices, ethical outlook,
art, forms and cultural ethos, demands a total allegiance from the believers. Hick wants to analyze the phenomenon
of religious pluralism from the point of view of salvation. Generally all religions see salvation as moving from selfcenteredness to God-centeredness. Analyzing the definition of salvation offered by each religion shows that all their
various definitions come from a single understanding of the givenness of human existence as ‘the state of fallenness’.
The first part of the article presents before us some of the challenge presented by different religions claiming to be the
ways to the divine, or the Real, as Hick prefers to call it.

Hick begins his article by acknowledging the many religious traditions, each with its own
distinctive beliefs, spiritual practices, ethical outlook, art forms, and cultural ethos. For example,
Catholic Christians believe in Trinitarian, namely, God the Father who created, God the Son came
to save humanity by sacrificing his human life on the cross and God the Holy Spirit, who constantly
cares for us all. Therefore the Catholics view the cross as a symbol of redemption and they also
draw the sign of the cross on them reminding them of the presence of the Holy Trinity. It is
obligatory for them to participate in the Sunday worship. They do all these things and more as a
response to the Divine. Jews keep the Sabbath and the commandments as a sign of their religious
4

commitment. Muslims pray five times a day and pray facing the direction of Mecca. Both Jews
and Muslims avoid eating certain food like pork considering it unclean. Brahmins of Hindu
religion are strict vegetarians. Hindus believe that life is conditioned by karma, the result of one’s
actions in the previous birth, from which one could be liberated through the performance of
dharma, which is righteous action or the duty pertaining to that particular birth. Therefore, dharma
is performed as a response to the divine. Thus each religious tradition has its own characteristics.
Hick also points out that despite the radical differences and distinctive characters of different
religions there are also overlaps. In other words, most of the major religions agree that this world
is transitory and earthly life is ephemeral, but there is a possibility of eternity after this life; God
is everywhere; prayer, fasting, and other such spiritual practices bring blessings of God or gods,
and so forth.

Hick’s article takes for granted that there is only one divine reality and all different
religions are trying to make sense of the same ultimate reality. Though there are many names given
to the divine reality by various religions, in order to be neutral, he chooses to use the word ‘Real’
for the ultimate divine reality. The distinctive characters of religions are manifested in their
understanding of the Real and their responses to the Real. He says that as long as the distinctive
characters and practices of each religious tradition are seen as human phenomena, there is no
problem. By that he means that there is no problem or conflict if such various beliefs, spiritual
practices, and so on, are merely spontaneous activities of individuals in relation to the Real. On
the contrary, if such beliefs or spiritual practices are considered as proper responses to the Real,
defined by a group of people belonging to a particular religion, the differences are a problem for
Hick. In reality every religious tradition presents itself both implicitly and explicitly as absolute
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and unsurpassable in its understanding of the Real and demands total allegiance from the believer.
The problem of the relationship among the various religious traditions is posed by their divergent
belief-systems. Every religion has designed its beliefs, practices, its ethical outlooks, art forms and
cultural ethos as responses to the Real it perceives in the reality based on its beliefs and doctrines.
In such approaches by various religions, there are both overlaps and radical differences. While
acknowledging these, Hick also points out some of the radical differences among the divergent
belief-systems. He raises questions such as: “Is the divine personal or non-personal; if personal, is
it unitary or triune; is the universe created, or emanated, or itself eternal; do we live only once on
this earth or are we repeatedly reborn?”3 Evidently there are many practices among religions that
overlap too. For an example Jerusalem is the Holy City for Jews, Christians and Muslims. Though
numerous wars have been fought by all the three religions to keep control over it, all of them not
only consider Jerusalem as the Holy City but also maintain it by visiting there as pilgrims. Jews,
Christians and Muslims try to respect the religious establishments of all three religions. On Ash
Wednesday the Catholics apply ashes on their forehead as a sign of the beginning of the Lenten
season as well as a reminder of the impermanence of life on earth. Likewise, Hindus in general
apply ashes on their forehead everyday to remind themselves of the emptiness or the evanescent
nature of this earthly life. Generally, most of the major religions practice fasting and prayer in
order to gain blessings from the Real.

To understand the differences, Hick points to the various names of the Divine or the Real.
‘God’ is a very commonly used term for the divine but it has different meanings to different people:
for Jews - ‘Yahweh’, for Christians – the Trinity, for Muslims – ‘Allah’, for Mahayana Buddhists

3

Hick, John. (2014). Religion Pluralism and Salvation. Cahn, Steven M. (ed.). Reason and Religion: Philosophy
looks at the World’s Religious Beliefs. USA: Wadsworth, 361.
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– Buddha, for Hindus of Vaishnavism – Vishnu, for Hindus of Saivism – Siva, for Hindus of
Advaitins – Brahman, for Hindus of Sakthism – Sakthi, for folk religions– the heroes who did great
things or died for his/her community, and so on. Deities of folk religions are ordinary people who
contributed extraordinarily for the welfare of the community or sacrificed their lives for their
communities. There are temples built for such heroes like Mahatma Gandhi4, Auvaiyar5 (a great
ancient Tamil poetess), Madurai Veeran, and so forth.

For Hick, there are many variations in understanding the Real: whether the Real is personal
or impersonal; if personal, is it unitary (Islam) or triune (Christianity)? Is the universe created
(Creationist), or emanated or evolved (those who hold that the world emanated from God hold
God not merely as an ordering principle but also as a productive principle 6), or exists eternally?
Do we live only once on this earth or are we repeatedly reborn as Hindus believe? Christians
believe in only one birth and the redemption brought for the whole humanity by Jesus once and
for all. On the contrary, Hindus in general believe in several rebirths which are determined by
one’s karma from the previous life. All the orthodox religions believe in a transcendent being that
cares for the world and humanity. Spirituality is a field in which one may not have the complete
knowledge of the divine unlike a material object. Karen Armstrong in her acclaimed book: The
History of God,7 says that the almighty does not change but our understandings of God and
expressions change. She says that the human idea of God has a history where in each generation

4

There is one temple in Orissa, India for Mahatma Gandhi. On line resource:
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-04-03/news/27633299_1_gandhi-temple-communal-amitymahatma-gandhi. Accessed on 08/05/2014.
5
Cf., Avvaiyar temple. Online resource: http://incrediblekumari.blogspot.com/2008/07/avvaiyaramman-templemuppanthal.html. Accessed on 08/05/2014.
6
Cf., Tanner, Kathryn. (2013). Creation ex nihilo as mixed metaphor. Modern Theology. 29 (2), 145.
7
Cf., Armstrong, Karen. (1994). A Histoy of God: The 4000 Years Quest for Judaism, Christianity and Islam. New
York: Ballentine Books. 9.
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the idea of God is slightly different from the previous generation. Since every culture is unique
and different from others, the understanding and expression of the divine also would be different.
Homo sapiens has come a long way in the history of evolution. Parallel to evolution human
understanding of the divine also has been evolving. Hick’s focus on religious diversity is so vast
an area of research that it cannot be done in its entirety, for it is still an ongoing reality. Hick
chooses to approach the issue of religious pluralism starting from the understanding of salvation.
Salvation is the common concept in all the religions. Though salvation is basically a Christian
term, with equivalent meaning there are also words like redemption, liberation, mukti, mokcha,
nirvana, and so on used in most other religions. Hick calls ‘salvation’ a post-axial concept. He
says that the aim of the pre-axial religions8 was primarily polytheistic, and they were centrally
concerned to keep life going on an even keel. But in the axial age of the 1st millennium B.C.E.,
principally, Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam – were centrally concerned
with a radical transformation of the human situation. Human beings began to see the world in a
broader sense. They transcended their tribal mentality to see the world as one under one God.

If we examine the understanding of salvation, each religion differs.

According to

Christianity, as Hick would say, salvation is being forgiven by God because of Jesus’ atoning death
and so becoming part of God’s redeemed community, the church. According to Mahayana

8

Pre-axial religion
Axial age is a term first introduced by German philosopher Karl Jaspers to describe the
period from 800 to 200 BCE during which, similar revolutionary thinking appeared in Persia, India, China, the
Occident, the Middle East and Greece. It is the pivotal point around which the whole human development revolves.
Pre-axial age can be marked by the transition of human civilization from gathering and hunting to agriculture,
domesticating animals and animal husbandry, from the exclusive understanding of tribal gods to inclusive
understanding of God and the universe as one. In the Pre-axial age people had limited language skills for
communication and very limited knowledge of the nature and therefore there was limited religious development. Postaxial age began with the axial age in which the religions, principally Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity,
Islam, etc. Ref: Tomek, Vladimir. (2007). The Axial Age, previous eras, & Consequences of the Axial Age. Religious
Tolerance.Org. Online resource: http://www.religioustolerance.org/tomek26.htm. Accessed on 06/09/2014.
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Buddhism, salvation is liberation, which is the attainment of satori or awakening, and so becoming
an ego-free manifestation of the eternal Dharmakaya. Liberation in Advaita is the realization of
Tat-tvam-asi. It is the realization of the individual soul that he/she is the Brahman. Saivism teaches
that liberation is freeing pasu (soul) from pasa (the bondage of the world) and to turn to pathy
(God).9 Salvation in Islam is entering into a place of excessive indulgence of every pleasure known
to man. Judaism speaks of salvation as the bodily resurrection by Pharisees or the liberation of the
soul only from the body advocated by philosophers like Maimonides.10

While we trace understandings of salvation by various religions, evidently all religions take
for granted the given the fallenness of human beings. Hick points out how each tradition
conceptualizes in its own way, the wrongness of ordinary human existence – as a state of fallenness
from paradisal virtue and happiness, or as a condition of moral weakness and alienation from God,
or as the fragmentation of the infinite One into false individualities, or as a self-centeredness which
pervasively poisons our involvement in the world process, making it to us an experience of anxious
unhappy fulfillment. Each religion portrays salvation as a limitlessly better possibility from than
given fallenness. Salvation is claimed to be the joy of conforming one’s life to God’s Law for
Jews; of giving oneself to God in Christ for Christians; of surrendering oneself completely to Allah
for Muslims; of transcending ego and realizing oneness with the limitless for Advaitins of
Hinduism; of overcoming the ego point of view and entering into the serene selflessness of nirvana
for Buddhists; and so on. In short, all the religions project salvation to be the total transformation

9

Cf., V, Jayaram. (N.A.). Pasa, The Three Bonds That Hold You Back. Saivism.net. Online Resource:
http://saivism.net/. Accessed on 08/10/2014.
10
Cf., Krell, Marc A. (N.A.). After Life and Salvation. Religion Library: Judaism. Online resource:
http://www.patheos.com/Library/Judaism/Beliefs/Afterlife-and-Salvation?offset=1&max=1. Accessed on
06/21/2014.
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of human existence from self-centeredness to a new orientation, centered in the divine reality. That
immeasurable superior possibility is available and entered upon here and now.

Hick brings to our attention another important factor, that is, each religion has defined and
designed a particular way as the only means to enter into salvation. Salvation is achieved through
being faithful to Torah for Jews; becoming a disciple to Jesus for Christians; being adherent to the
Quranic way of life for Muslims; following the eightfold path for Buddhists; practicing the three
great margas, namely, mystical insight, activity in the world and self-giving devotion to God, for
Hindus.

There are many religions but their terrain is only one world and their subject is the divine that
transcends the worldly reality. Human beings are those led toward salvation by religions. The
transcending quality of the divine is the reason for the existence of so many religions. As the divine
is not a material reality, each religion claims to have the right understanding of the divine and the
only way to salvation. The problem Hick points out here is that while each religion claims to have
the right knowledge of the divine, simultaneously, denies every other understandings and the ways
of all other religions.

1.2.

If all are ways of salvation, then which is superior among them?

The first part concluded that salvation is a move from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. The second part
presents before us the difficulty in comprehending the unobservable development of spiritual quality of a human
relationship to the Real except through its fruits. Science is interested in dealing with matters that can be subjected
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to laboratory experiments, and scientific method is always vindicated by its fruits. Can we apply the same
approach to religions that deal with the transcendent reality?

We humans as contingent beings primarily depend on our senses to appraise anything of the
world around us. Science tries to define any reality within its domain of experiments. But, religion
deals with the transcendent reality, which is expressed on one level, in human words and action,
particularly, in rites and rituals. On another level it is lived out by humans in the moral life.
Therefore, Hick concludes that the only way to evaluate the superiority of any religion is by
evaluating its fruits which must be evident in the human moral life. Each religion claims to
constitute an effective context within which the transformation is possible. We cannot directly
observe the inner quality of a human relationship to the Real, but we can observe the fruits of that
relationship in the moral and spiritual quality of a human personality and in a man or woman’s
relationship to others.

For Hick, the word ‘spiritual’ means a quality or orientation in the life of saints or arahat,
bodhisattva, jivanmukti, mahatma, etc. In the above cases, human life is described as becoming
part of the life of the Real or being permeated from within by the eternal reality of Brahman or
becoming one with the eternal Buddha nature. A saintly state is the transformed state from selfcenteredness to the Real-centeredness as manifested in every tradition. There is a change in their
deepest orientation from centeredness in the ego to a new centering in the Real, where one is
empowered to live as an instrument of God/ Truth/Reality. Hick also acknowledges from his own
experience that one is conscious in the presence of such a saintly person who is open to the
transcendence. He shares one such experience in his autobiography as follows,

11

One day we were all taken by bus to visit Mahabalipuram and Kanchipuram, where we had an audience with
the Shankaracharia of Kanchi. He is an old man with very beautiful face and intelligent, twinkling eyes. He
came into the barn-like room and sat cross-legged on a table precariously held together with string, and we
were each introduced to him, after which there was some discussion, someone translating throughout. I can
well believe that he is a saint; but he did not have anything particularly interesting or illuminating to say to
the assembled philosophers. The meeting was, in Hindu terms, more in the nature of darshan, simply being
in the presence of a holy person. 11

Hick divides the saints into two major categories, namely, saints who withdraw from the world
into prayer or meditation, and saints who seek to change or transform the world. He also gives
some examples that fit those categories, like, Julian of Norwich who spent her life in prayer or
political Joan of Arc in the medieval century, Sri Aurobindo and Mahatma Gandhi12 in our own
century. Hick himself in one of his talks mentions Julian of Norwich, a fifteenth century Christian
mystic, who saw visions of Jesus and wrote down those which were mostly positive about the
world and human life in the future.13

In our present age of social consciousness, we are aware that every human understanding
of social, political and economical systems could be analyzed and changed if needed. In such a
given situation, a saintly person cannot but be involved in social and political reform, because
saints are part and parcel of this mundane reality. Saints are, in fact, not different from us but they
are more advanced in the salvific transformation. As already mentioned, one is able to become
aware of a saintly person’s openness to the transcendent, while we are also capable of identifying
the ethical aspect of this salvific transformation in individuals through observing their behaviors.

11

Hick, John.( 2005). John Hick: An Autobiography. England: One Word Publications. 196.
Cf., Hick, John. (1993). Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion, 86. In his book, Hick
admires Mahatma Gandhi’s greatness saying how Gandhi was recognized by hundreds of millions in India as
Mahatma, a great soul. He who had realized the human moral and spiritual potential to a rare degree, inspired many
others to rise to a new level of effective self-giving love for others.
13
Cf., Hick, John. (2002). Reincarnation and the Meaning of life (A talk given to the Open End, Birmingham,
December 2002), 14. Online resource: http://www.johnhick.org.uk/nietzsche.pdf. Accessed on 06/23/2014.
12
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But it is challenging to identify the kind of behavior in an individual that corresponds to the Real,
and it is all the more difficult to determine which religion has the best ethical criteria. Therefore,
Hick suggests a common criterion from the moral insights of great traditions, namely,
love/compassion, because it plays a central and normative role in giving unselfish regard to others.
Further he substantiates that criterion by citing sayings from various great religious writings: ‘One
should never do to another that which one would regard as injurious to oneself. This, in brief, is
the rule of Righteousness,’ (Anushana parva, 113:7 of Mahabharatha, an ancient Hindu epic) and
‘He who….benefits persons of all orders, who is always devoted to the good of all beings, who
does not feel aversion to anybody…..succeeds in ascending into Heaven’ (Anushana parva, 145:24
of Mahabharatha, an ancient Hindu epic); ‘As a mother cares for her son, all her days, so towards
all living things a man’s mind should be all-embracing’(Sutta Nipata, 149 of Buddhism): ‘(one
should go about) treating all creatures in the world as he himself would be treated’ says Jain
scriptures (Kintanga Sutra, I.ii.33 of Jain Scriptures); ‘Do not do to others what you would not
like yourself’ (Analects, xxi, 2 of Confucius); (the good man will) regard (others) gains as if they
were his own, and their losses in the same way’ (Thai Shang, 3 of Taoist scripture); ‘The nature
only is good when it shall not do unto another whatever is not good for its own self’ (Dadistan-idinik, 94:5 of the Zorostrian scriptures); ‘As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to
them likewise’ (Luke 6:31 of Jesus); ‘What is hateful to yourself do not do to your fellow man.
That is the whole of the Torah’ (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbath 31a of Judaism); ‘No man is a true
believer unless he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself’ (Ibn Madja, Intro. 9 of
Islam); etc.14

14

Cf., Hick, John. (2014). Religion Pluralism and Salvation. Cahn, Steven M. (ed), Reason and Religions:
Philosophy looks at the World’s Religious Beliefs. USA: Wadsworth, 363.
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Hick feels comfortable in using love/compassion as the common criterion which is the
basis for giving unselfish regard to others. All the major religions / faiths emphasize the virtue of
love/compassion and teach humanity to avoid injustice, unnecessary suffering, and to live in peace.
Despite the religious teachings, the personal virtues as well as vices are basically much the same
within different religion-cultural settings. We witness both love and hatred or selflessness and
selfishness spread more or less equally in every society. Therefore, Hick worries that there is no
way of making a responsible judgment in this area. There is no good reason to believe that any one
of the great religious tradition has proved itself to be more productive of love than another.
Meanwhile, it is pretty easy for someone to see clearly enough the defects of the others from within
each culture. But an objective ethical comparison of such vast and complex totalities is at present
an unattainable ideal. Therefore no single institution can claim an over-all moral superiority.

From within each culture one can clearly see the defects of the others. My seeing or
evaluating is always in reference to the understanding of where I belong or my frame of reference.
My understanding of the group to which I belong is much influenced by its beliefs, ideologies, and
so forth. My belonging to a group could come from my existential situation, namely, my birth or
my coming into contact with the group. We shall try to understand this a little more clearly. At
birth, probably, one enters into this world as a stranger. He needs a basis to know oneself and the
world around. A newborn starts crying immediately after its birth, probably, it is due to its fear of
anonymity. A person begins to base oneself on the outlook of his immediate family. Though a
person seems impartial and unattached at birth, the person begins to attach oneself to some group
that accommodates him/her. Then one gets indoctrinated automatically or naturally by the group
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or society where one belongs. In other words, to be in this world is to belong somewhere, and thus
one forms a basic structure of ideas and convictions. And thereafter, in every interaction, one filters
every other idea that comes from outside in reference to one’s basic outlook. The challenge here
is to know whether one’s ideology paradigm is right or wrong universally. As long as one’s
convictions are culture-bound, they are right in reference to one’s culture. It is not necessary that
the same should be universally right. There are some tribes in Rajasthan where marriage within
the tribe is a taboo. Every female in that particular tribe is a sister to the men within the tribe.
Unlike these few tribes in Rajasthan most other people in India practice strict endogamy. Therefore
Hick is correct in saying that a universal objective ethical comparison of the totalities is
unattainable. Along the same line, no single religion or any other institution can claim an over-all
moral superiority. We can take for granted that there is no way to find out whether an ideology is
universally valid. At the same time, we might agree with Hick that those ideologies that revolve
around love or compassion are universally beneficial to humanity.15

Further, Hick acknowledges that every religion explicitly or implicitly means and teaches
love. Though an individual’s absorption of love occurs within the context, of a life situation or the
teaching of love by an institution is conditioned, there are generally recognized attitudes with
which some actions are done out of love. Those actions which are performed for the benefit of
other human beings, sometimes to the point of sacrificing one’s own life, could be recognized as
an act done ‘out of love’. Even though understanding and teaching of love by every individual and
institution is limited, still an act of love is easily recognized, as it is done without any selfish
motive, purely for the benefit of others.
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Hick says that generally we do come to know that love/compassion has been witnessed
among the people within their respective communities, their religion, profession, and so on,
supplemented by travelers’ tales and anecdotes. In that connection he mentions a report of a
remarkable degree of self-giving love practiced among the Hindu families in the mud huts along
Madras shore, India. He adds that there are many such similar accounts from biographies, social
histories and novels of Muslim villages in Africa, Buddhist life in Thailand, Hindu life in India,
Jewish life in New York, Christian life around the world, both in the past and today.

Hick is convinced that personal virtues (as well as vices) are basically much the same
within all different religious-cultural settings. We see that love/compassion is spread in every
society as much as cruelty, greed, hatred, selfishness and malice. Irrespective of the presence of
love/compassion in every society, Hick feels that we cannot get a precise data of its presence for
a comparative study of any social or religious communities in order to make any responsible
judgment. The subject we want to analyze is so intermingled with varying natural conditions of
human life in different periods of history and in different economic and political circumstances
that it cannot be evaluated in isolation. For example, if we examine the impact of economy in
society, we are surprised by the varying results in the ethical behavior of people. It may sound
logical to think that the poor are more likely to steal and cheat, and the rich are fairer. But Berkeley
psychologists Paul Piff and Dacher Keltner’s studies suggest that people’s compassionate feelings
decline as people climb the social ladder. In one study they found that the less affluent were more
likely to express their feeling of compassion towards others on a regular basis such as saying, ‘I
often notice people who need help,’ and ‘It is important to take care of people who are
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vulnerable.’16 Such studies help us realize that the economic situation has more impact on the
social behavior of people than the religious factor.

Hick is also aware of another major hurdle in evaluating religions, namely, that the
religious cultures have been active in the society for a very long time and have so mingled with
daily life. It is very difficult to make any judgment on particular religions because we can never
have total information about any one religion. Additionally, even the fragments of collected
information cannot be judged in isolation but always in the light of many other varying periods of
history, as well as different economic and political circumstances. If we consider all the previously
mentioned reasons, then, we can hardly agree with any one religion that claims to be more
productive of love/compassion than another religion. Similarly we cannot also compare the largescale social outlooks of the different salvation projects of various religions, because there too we
have the same difficulty. And Hick believes that each religion had its own time of flourishing and
deterioration. Every religion has contributed both good and evil to its society. But, even here we
cannot evaluate the good and evil of each religion cross-culturally. Hick shows the vulnerability
‘in the weighing of the lack of economic progress and consequent widespread of poverty in
traditional Hinduism and Buddhism against the endemic racism of Christian civilization,
culminating in the twentieth century Holocaust’. There is a world of difference between the
western and the eastern cultures, for example, the arranged marriage of the east against the western
concept of marriage as one’s own choice. It is understandable that both have their merits and
demerits.
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From within each culture one can easily see the defects of another culture because our own
is our frame of reference. One tends to identify oneself with the group he/she belongs to. Belonging
to a particular group may come to one as a result of one’s birth in a group. At the moment of birth
one may not have an identity of his/her own and neither any influence from outside. An individual
develops his/her identity gradually through his/her interaction with the surroundings. In person’s
every interaction one filters every other idea that comes from outside according to one’s already
accumulated knowledge from his/her surroundings. Since every person’s ideology is formed
depending on the group one belongs to, there cannot be any ideal ideology common for all. In such
a condition, it is impossible to make an objective ethical comparison of any vast and complex
totalities such as religions. Consequently we can conclude that there can be no religion to claim an
over-all moral superiority. Even though we cannot comprehend of the totality of religious
phenomena, Hick proposes love/compassion as the ideal virtue to measure the impact of religions
on the individuals. Love/compassion is the ideal virtue that is universally beneficial to the whole
of humanity. Every religion both implicitly and explicitly teaches love. Still that love is
conditioned by one’s worldview which is already conditioned by both the group one belongs to
and one’s own capacity for absorbing and personalizing truth. The remedy is to be aware of the
limitation of every individual as well as the group which one belongs to. As long as an individual
is a contingent being one’s observation, understanding, expression, and everything else will be
contingent. Better be aware of our contingency, so that we may be always open to truth wherever
it may come from.
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Salvation is an actual change in human beings from self-centeredness to divine centeredness.
Hick understands that though all the world religions are guiding humans towards salvation, there
is no way of verifying which religion is salvifically superior to the rest. In order to compare the
effects of various religions we may need to have observable data. Such data may be collected from
the individuals in whose lives their moral aspects are easily observable. In history we find that all
the major religions approved war against another religion at one or another time. Still today
religions are warring against each other in many ways. By considering salvation to be a new
orientation that has both a more elusive “spiritual” character and a more readily observable moral
aspect, Hick concludes in this section that there is no religion salvifically superior to the rest.

1.3.

First level doctrinal conflict

The last section concluded that there is no religion salvifically superior. In this section Hick explains that since the
Real is transcendent there are various kinds and levels of doctrinal conflicts of different traditions who define the Real
in their own way. And once again this shows that there is no religion that has proved to be soteriologically more
effective than all others. Here, Hick utilizes a Kantian insight to challenge the foundation of the doctrinal claims of
various religions.

Hick begins this section mentioning the names of the Real given by people of different
faiths, times and places as Jahweh, or the Holy Trinity, or Allah, or Siva, or Vishnu, or as Brahman,
or the Dharmakaya, the Tao, and so on. And already we have seen that Hick established that
salvation with the meaning of transformation takes place in all religions. Having said that, Hick
makes a hypothesizes that if salvation is taking place to about the same extent within the religious
systems presided over by these various deities and absolutes, then all these deities must be only

19

various manifestations of the more ultimate ground of all salvific transformation. Further Hick
proposes a possibility for our consideration saying, “Let us then consider the possibility that an
infinite transcendent divine reality is being differently conceived, and therefore differently
experienced, and therefore differently responded to from within our different religio-cultural ways
of being human.”17 By that he simply means that salvific transformation is possible in all religious
traditions. However, there are various kinds of doctrinal conflicts because of different conceptions
of the ultimate reality which is transcendent.

With a Kantian understanding on the process of knowledge, Hick explains how human
experience is partly formed by the conceptual and linguistic frameworks within which it occurs.
According to Kant, perception is not merely an activity of our senses alone but also of the mind
which is constantly active in perception and one’s environment as it appears to a consciousness
operating with one’s particular conceptual resources and habits. Further Hick says that this
understanding of the knowledge process is supported by cognitive psychology and sociology of
knowledge. Michael Rohlf says,
Kant’s revolutionary position in the Critique is that we can have a priori knowledge about the general
structure of the sensible world because it is not entirely independent of the human mind. The sensible world
or the world of appearance, is constructed by the human mind. The sensible world, or the world of
appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive
passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge
only about aspects of the sensible world that reflects the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. In
Kant’s words, “we can cognize of things a priori only when we ourselves have put into them” (Bxviii). So
according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself
depends on the way the human mind structures its experience.18

According to Kant, perception is never passive, but always accompanied by the process of an
active mind. When we perceive something we are simultaneously aware of our environment which
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is present to the consciousness that processes our particular conceptual resources and habits.
Therefore there can be no pure perception of anything at all. According to Hick, this is the case
with the analysis of religious experience if we analyze the phenomenon of religious experience
inductively. In such analysis Hick suggests two possibilities. The first one is to postulate an
ultimate transcendent Reality which in itself is beyond human experience and conception, except
as it appears through our various human thought forms. And the second one is to identify the
thought-and-experienced deities and absolutes with different historical forms of human
consciousness. This concept is easily explained in Kantian terms as follows. The divine/Real is
experienced through different human receptivities as a range of divine phenomena. Even prior to
that process, religious concepts have played an essential role in the formation of human
receptivities themselves. These different human receptivities produce many variations because
they also consist of conceptual schemas which are influenced by personal, communal and
historical factors. The Real is basically thought and experienced as a personal deity or non-personal
absolute. But in general it is not actually experienced either as deity or as the absolute. In Kantian
terminology each basic concept becomes schematized in more concrete form as influenced by
individual and cultural factors.

Likewise, one’s religious tradition with its history, ethos,

exemplars, scriptures, devotional meditative practices, and so on, shapes our basic concept of the
Real. Religious influence of that sort becomes like a ‘lens’ through which we see the Real
specifically as Adonai, or as the Heavenly Father, or as Allah, or Vishnu, or Siva, or non-personal
Brahman, or Dharmakaya, or the Void, or the Ground. Therefore, one can say that an individual
experiences the Real only as per the teaching of his/her own religion.
Hick consolidates all the above in three explanatory statements as follows.
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1. The multiple deities and absolutes are only manifestations and appearances of the Real just like
a mountain may appear in varying ways to differently placed observers. If that is the case with a
physical reality it would be much more divergent for the infinite transcendental reality as the
varying human conceptual schemas may produce varying modes of phenomenal experience.
Though the appearances are not the Real an sich, they are not illusory.

2. That the Real is beyond the range of our human concepts does not mean that it is beyond the
scope of purely formal, logically generated concepts. The Real is on noumenal ground but cannot
be understood in that ground. Therefore we have no base to qualify the Real an sich as singular or
plural, substance or process, personal or non-personal, good or bad, purposive or non-purposive.
In support Hick presents various quotes from different religious traditions as follows:
Gregory of Nyssa: “The simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that which He is, namely,
incapable of being grasped by any term or any idea, or any other device of our apprehension,
remaining beyond the reach not only of the human but of the angelic and supramundane in words,
having but one name that can represent His proper nature, the single name being ‘Above Every
Name’ (Against Eunomius I, 42).”19
Augustine: “God transcends even the mind” (True Religion, 36:67)
Aquinas: “by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches”
(Contra Gentiles, I, 14, 3)
Qur’an: God is “beyond what they desire” (6:101)
The Upanishads: There the eye goes not, speech goes not, nor the mind” (Kena Up, 1,3)
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Shankara: Brahman is that “before which words recoil, and to which no understanding has ever
attained” (Otto, Mysticism East and West, E.T. 1932, p. 28)
It is fitting here to recall an act from the book The Little Prince, written by Antonine de Saint
Exupery. The Little Prince asks the pilot to draw a picture of a goat for him. The pilot also draws
a few pictures of a goat that did not impress the Little Prince for he wanted a goat with horns. After
attempting to draw many pictures he still fails to satisfy the Little Prince. Finally, the exhausted
pilot finally draws a box and tells the Little Prince that the sheep he requested was inside the box.
The Little Prince looked so pleased at this picture and expressed in excitement, ‘That is exactly
the way I wanted it!’.20 If there could be such an unarticulated and incomprehensible world of
difference between the perception of a child and an adult with regard to an image of a sheep, we
need not say how different our perceptions should be of the Real.

3. There is a need to postulate an ineffable and unobservable divine-reality-in-itself so that we
account for the various forms of religious experience, or else all those forms of religious experience
would be categorized as mere human projections. ‘If on the other hand there is such a transcendent
ground, then all these phenomena may be joint products of the universal presence of the Real and
of the varying sets of concepts and images that have crystallized within the religious traditions of
the earth.’ Therefore, postulating a transcendent reality affirms that religious experiences are
human responses to the Real though they are culturally conditioned.

As Hick concludes the third section, he spells out clearly the main issue he addresses in this
article, namely, the doctrinal conflicts. He hypothesizes that the doctrinal conflicts embody
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different conceptions of the ultimate that arise from the variations between different sets of human
conceptual schema and spiritual practices advocated by different religions. Furthermore, each of
these varying ways of thinking-and-experiencing the Real in respect to their religious teaching has
influenced human life.

1.4.

The Second level of doctrinal difference deals with some
metaphysical beliefs.

In this section Hick mentions some of the issues connected with the metaphysical relationship between the Real
and the material universe, human destiny, heaven, hell, purgatories, angels and devil and many other subsidiary states
and entities. Additionally he shows that such metaphysical issues remain as open-ended questions, for there is no
guaranteed certainty about them. However, he says that those issues are least important with regard to salvation.

There are three sets of metaphysical issues mentioned by Hick in this section. Firstly, he
mentions some of the metaphysical ambiguities or uncertainties regarding the relationship between
the material universe and the Real, namely, the creation ex nihilo, emanation, eternal universe, an
unknown form of dependency, and so on. Secondly, Hick acknowledges the metaphysical
ambiguities connected with human beings, namely, reincarnation or a single life, eternal identity
or transcendence of the self. And thirdly, he mentions the questions about heavens and hells,
purgatories, angels, devils, and many other subsidiary states and entities.

The concept, ‘creation ex nihilo’ means that God created this world out of nothing. The Bible
states that God created this world (Gen 1:1). However, the issue is whether God created this world
out of nothing or something. The early Fathers of the Church such as Theophilus, Justin Martyr,
and Origen actually believed that the world was created out of the preexisting matter. Thus God
24

brought an order in the chaotic matter. But this view was mostly rejected by the fourth century
theologians because it involved problems raised by Gnosticism. Irenaeus (130-200) rejected the
idea of preexistent matter saying, ‘There was no preexistent matter; everything is required to be
created out of nothing’ (McGrath, 38). In contrast to the Aristotelian view of an independently
existing world, Tertullian (160-225) argued that the world depended on God for its existence. Colin
Gunton, one of the greatest British theologians of the 20th century said, ‘God is not a potter who
makes a pot from the clay which is to hand; he is rather, like one who makes both the clay and pot.
This teaching which baffles understanding and is often rejected because there is no analogy to it
in human experience must be understood as an interpretation and summary of scripture’s witness
to God as a whole,’ (The Christian Faith, p. 17)21 Regarding the theory of emanation we may find
Spinoza’s understanding supporting it but still there is no conclusive evidence for that. Many such
theories remain as only speculations or hypotheses.

The idea of reincarnation is connected mostly with Hinduism, which is based on karma and is
the fruit of one’s action in the previous birth. Accordingly the soul experiences reincarnation
repeatedly until it is made pure to become one with its source, the Divine. During this purifying
process the soul passes through many forms, bodies, lives and deaths. There is also a kind of
reincarnation in Buddhism but it does not believe in the existence of soul (Cf., anatamavada);
therefore the reincarnation is of consciousness. Liberation (nirvana) in Buddhism is the extinction
of desire, hatred, ignorance, suffering and rebirth, in short, the annihilation of the whole self.22
According to Buddhism a human person is made up of five aggregates (khandhas), namely, “(1)
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corporeality or physical forms (rupa), (2) feelings or sensations (vedana), (3) ideations (sanna),
(4) mental formations or dispositions (sankhara) and (5) consciousness (vinnana). Human
existence is only a composite of the five aggregates, none of which is the self or soul. A person is
in a process of continuous change, and there is no fixed underlying entity.”23 Most other major
religions do not have reincarnation or rebirth doctrines. Hick argues that all these metaphysical
issues are important because they have such an impact on our belief system. Out of many
metaphysical issues Hick picks creation ex nihilo and reincarnation as vital to our belief systems.
He says that if creation ex nihilo were to be the case then it would give a sense of absolute
dependence on the creator. And the idea of reincarnation makes sense, for it offers hope for future
spiritual progress combined with karma. The principle of karma can justify and validate the present
inequalities in the society. On the other hand, the same karma is rejected by Buddhism precisely
because it justifies the social inequalities based on the caste system.

Apart from religious answers to metaphysical questions, there are also attempts to settle these
metaphysical issues scientifically. Scientists have been trying to prove that the world came about
more or less fifteen million years ago from the “big bang”. Accepting “the big bang” theory
necessarily rules out the idea of an eternal world. Despite the claims by science on “the big bang”
theory, we do not have sufficient reason to totally believe it, for it remains only a hypothesis.
Likewise, there are claims regarding the reincarnation even in modern times; still there is no
sufficient proof or agreed knowledge in these areas. Having discussed these metaphysical issues,
Hick presents Buddha’s approach to such questions. Some two and a half millennia ago, Buddha

Tucci, Giuseppe. Nakamura, Hajime . Reynolds, Frank E. The Buddha’s Message. Encyclopedia Brittanica.
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too listed out a series of “undetermined questions”(avyakata ) and said that attaining
salvation/liberation does not require the knowledge of all these issues but rather single-minded
quest for liberation/awakening. However, Hick wants to apply the principle of Buddha for the
entire range of metaphysical issues disputed by religions. Hick concludes that in the same way
adherence to no particular opinion or dogma is a requirement for salvation, since it is evident that
the transformation of human person from self-centeredness to the Real-centeredness takes place
in each tradition irrespective of their different dogmas and a believer’s correct knowledge of them.

1.5.

The third level of doctrinal disagreement

The third level of doctrinal disagreement concerns historical questions. All religions have relation to some
historical persons. All have their records of the past which rarely overlap. Even if they have their disputes about
their historical judgments that does not necessarily affect the salvation process.

Hick approaches the religious disagreement in reference to history. History is a record of the
past events, memories, discoveries, and so on. Every religion has its own link with history. The
scripture of every religion contains many elements of its religious history. Even in prehistoric time,
the religious experiences and teachings were kept alive through oral traditions. The Old Testament
bears witness to the Israelite people’s traditional custom in which the head of every family recites
the exodus story to his family annually during their Pascal celebration.

Every great tradition has its own historical roots because each religion is connected with
individuals or groups who had faith experience in the past. Thus the religions have their historical
beliefs. Hick gives examples of some of the major religions and the historical figures connected
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with them. Judaism believes in the main features of history described in the Hebrew Bible, which
may include their liberation from Egypt, their ancestors like Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, King
David, etc. Christian beliefs included that of the Old Testament as well as the life, death and
resurrection of Jesus as described in the New Testament. Islam has its own main features of history
described in the Quran mainly in the vision and life of Mohamed. The Vaishnavite Hinduism
includes the belief in the historicity of Krishna. In the case of Buddhism the historicity of Gautama
and his enlightenment at Bodhi Gaya are its historical reminders.

Having given some of the historical connections of religions Hick says that generally these
historical roots or memories do not contradict their beliefs radically. Any contradiction would be
very minor. However, Hick acknowledges that there are disputes among the ancient Near Eastern
or Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. It is understandable as they all have the
same roots. He provides an example of a contradiction between the Old Testament and Quran by
indicating that according to Torah (Gen 22) it was Isaac whom Abraham was about to sacrifice at
Mount Moriah whereas it was Ishmael according to Quran (Sura 37). Furthermore, according to
Quran Jesus was a great prophet and “they did not slay him, neither crucified him, only a likeness
of that was shown them” (Sura 4:156) which completely contradicts the historical report of the
New Testament as well as the Christian theological belief. Though all such disputes connected
with history could be possibly clarified with historical evidences, still one may not be able to arrive
at certainty to settle it definitively, for the events in question are so remote. Therefore Hick says
that we may have to be content with the different communal memories. Hick, in his book Disputed
Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion, says that the idealized Jesus is unaffected
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by the defects of historical evidence.24 Having analyzed the historical connections and their
ambiguities in various religions, Hick says that irrespective of the importance of the communal
memories of their history, the variance in their historical judgments do not prevent the different
traditions from providing an effective context of salvation.

1.6.

Hick draws the following Conclusions

1. Our human religious experience is a cognitive response to the universal presence of the
ultimate divine Reality that, in itself, exceeds human conceptuality.
Though we recognize the universal presence of the ultimate divine Reality, still we are
not capable of comprehending that Reality, for that exceeds all our conceptualization.
And our human religious experience is not immaculate but rather shaped by our
religious tradition.

2. The Reality is, however, manifested to us in ways formed by a variety of human
concepts including the range of divine personae and metaphysical impersonae
witnessed to in the history of religions.

3. Each major tradition, built around its own distinctive way of thinking-and-experiencing
the Real has developed its own answers to the perennial questions of our origin and
destiny, constituting more or less comprehensive and coherent cosmologies and
eschatologies.
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For Hick those answers developed and provided by different religious traditions to the
perennial metaphysical questions about human origin and destiny cannot be completely
true, for they are of human creation. In other words, the worldviews presented to us by our
religions are partly true. By saying that, Hick rejects any part of revelation in religions, for
it is all of human origin.

4. The correctness of the cosmologies and eschatologies taught by the religions is not a
prerequisite for salvation, for salvation has been going on in all religious traditions
through the centuries. Therefore, Hick suggests that we might learn to tolerate the
differences in the cosmologies and eschatologies.

Can Hick really say that one’s understanding of cosmology and eschatology has nothing to
do with one’s transformation? Does everyone who is serious about his/her transformation
not have an understanding of the one’s origin and destiny that plays a role in deciding one’s
transformation? Of course, we do agree with him that salvation does not depend on the
correctness of a cosmology or eschatology one adapts to. We must also be aware that the
answers by various religions to metaphysical questions are not the final ones. The history
of the transition from Geo-centrism to Helio-centrism is a great example to show how the
understanding of cosmologies and eschatologies has been shaped by philosophers and
scientists as human development progresses. Nevertheless, any person who seriously seeks
his/her transformation may have to have an understanding of his/her origin, destiny, and
so on. Such understanding helps people in their ethical thinking and living.
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5. The assertion of the sole salvific efficacy of any particular tradition raises the problem
of belittling every other tradition. Christianity has such exclusive claims in New
Testament texts like ‘There is salvation in no one else [than Jesus Christ], for there is
no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved’ (Acts 4:12)
and the Catholic dogma:‘Extra ecclesia nulla salus’ (No salvation outside the Church).
And the Protestant equivalent is: no salvation outside Christianity. Such claims not only
speak of the relationship of Christians to God but also the relationship of non-Christians
to God, and it denies salvation to non-Christians.

We do agree with Hick who points out such dogmas or assertions are explicitly against
religious pluralism. The question here is whether this accusation is relevant because the
official documents of the Catholic Church are more inclusive in its understanding of
salvation as well as encourage a lot of interreligious dialogues.

6. Hick himself acknowledges that the exclusive approach has been abandoned and new
inclusive theology has emerged in the Catholic Church. The devout people of other
faiths are called “anonymous Christians” by Karl Rahner, which was endorsed by Vat.
II. Many Catholic scholars like Bede Griffiths too promoted religious pluralism with
still different approach. Griffiths writes,
We must pass into that world of non-duality, in which our present mode of consciousness is
transcended…In this view of the ultimate mystery of Being, which is the beginning and the end of
all our human aspiration, Hindu and Christian unite not only with one another but also with the
Buddhist and the Muslim. There is a final transcendent state of Being and Consciousness, in which
alone perfect bliss is to be found, to which every great religion bears witness. This state transcends
all concepts of the mind and images of the sense, and is known only when the Divine Being chooses
to reveal himself to man… May our study of different traditions of religion lead us all to a deeper
understanding of this Divine Mystery and to share in a greater measure of this Divine Bliss.25
25
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7. Again, though it is inclusive, still it claims superiority for the Catholic religion. Alvin
Plantinga’s article: “A Defense of Religious Exclusivism” would answer this point.

8. Each religion has designed its own way of finding/establishing transforming peace with
God. Hick demands that we must acknowledge that the immediate ground of
transformation is the particular spiritual path of that religion. Nobody has a problem in
accepting that. One who has green shades finds everything green. When a Christian
looks at other religious traditions he/she understands them in his/her own terms in
which one is trained. What is wrong with that?

9. Then Hick analyses a Christian inclusivist who by implication declares that the various
spiritual paths are efficacious, and constitute authentic contexts of salvation, because
Jesus died on the cross, and if Jesus had not died on the cross they would not be
efficacious. And he points out the irrelevance of such claim based on the time
differences. How are we to make sense of the idea that the salvific power of Dharma
taught five hundred years earlier by the Buddha is a consequence of the death of Jesus
in approximately 30 C.E.? This is not from Jesus or his disciples but a later
development.

Why not think from the point of view of the Christian inclusivist? Having been trained in
his faith, he/she can think anything only within the frame of his/her faith. Despite his/her
conviction of universal efficacy of salvation in Christ there is no harm to anybody. One is
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free to think in his/her own way. As we often tend to mistake uniformity with unity, we
tend to see pluralism at loss of individual identities.
10. Further Hick invites us to reinterpret Christian doctrines like Trinitarian, Christology
and soteriology in a way that is more compatible with our awareness of the independent
salvific authenticity of the other great faiths.
We must promote the reinterpretation of the doctrine more amicably in a world of
pluralism. But we have difficulty in deciding to reinterpret our own doctrines in order to
suit every other religious claim. If every religion is going to define its fundamental
doctrines in a way that do not contradict, in other words, not to differ from the doctrines of
other religions, we will end up nowhere. Won’t it be like throwing the baby out with the
bathwater? Once again Hick seems to mistake uniformity for unity.
However Hick completes his article with an appeal to each religion to rethink its inherited
assumption of its own unique superiority.
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Chapter 2.
Responses of Other Scholars to Hick

2.1.

Alvin Plantinga responds to Hick on behalf of the exclusivists.

John Hick in his article, “Religious Pluralism and Salvation” seems to conclude that the very
awareness of religious diversity demands that all religion must give up their claim of superiority
over other religions and their truth claims. In response to that, Alvin Plantinga’s article: A Defense
of Religious Exclusivism26, counteracts the challenges posed by John Hick from the point of view
of a believer who takes the doctrines of his religion very seriously. Plantinga gives two of his own
basic beliefs as a Christian:
(1). God is the creator of this world and He is an almighty, good and personal being.
(2). All human beings are in need of salvation and God’s plan is to redeem them through the
incarnation, life, sacrificial death, and resurrection of his divine son.
And he says that there could be three kinds of responses from three kinds of people. Firstly, the
non-Christian theistic religions may accept (1) and reject (2). Secondly, some people believe in
the existence of some divine power beyond the natural world and care for human-well being and
salvation. Thirdly, the naturalists do not believe in any of the above. Therefore, the challenge
before a believer is choosing a way to respond religiously to the world.27

26
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Plantinga also hypothesizes three possible reactions to religious diversity: 1.To continue to
believe what one has received from one’s tradition to be true, despite learning about the diversity.
That means all those propositions that are incompatible with (1) and (2) are false for a believer
who could be identified as an exclusivist by pluralists. 2. To withhold them believing neither them
nor their denial. 3. To accept their denial as many pluralist, like Hick, do. There is a widespread
apprehension that such exclusivism of the first sort is wrong and deplorable. This is the issue
Plantinga wants to clarify in his response to Hick. Generally pluralists accuse exclusivism of
epistemic and ethical failure. But Plantinga rejects both and all the more argues that exclusivism
is unavoidable, given the human condition.28

Plantinga identifies the accusations of the pluralists as not aimed at exclusivism itself but rather
the propriety or rightness of exclusivism. Plantinga begins his response by clarifying the concept
of ‘an exclusivist’. For Plantinga, an exclusivist is one who believes only his own beliefs, and
considers others false because they are incompatible with his. And further, Plantinga defines an
exclusivist as having three qualities:
i)

An exclusivist may be intellectually arrogant and egoistic just like any other person.

ii)

An exclusivist is aware of other faiths and has, to some degree, reflected on the
problem of pluralism.

iii)

An exclusivist not only holds beliefs like God is the creator of everything and Jesus
Christ is the Savior of the world but also considers false all other propositions
incompatible with his own beliefs. And he/she also meets condition C, namely, a)being

28
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rather fully aware of other religions, b) knowing that there is also some genuine piety
and devoutness in them and c) believing that he/she knows of no argument that would
necessarily convince all or most honest and intelligent dissenters.

First of all, Plantinga addresses the moral complaints against an exclusivist, namely, the
charges of oppression and imperialism. And he says that there are always some who reject some
beliefs an individual has. In that case one cannot say that those people who reject his opinion
oppress him/her who believes in some beliefs which they do not believe. And at the same time he
acknowledges that exclusivism could in some way contribute to oppression. It is always the case
with everyone that others may not believe some beliefs of an individual. Moreover Plantinga calls
it logical that while an exclusivist believes in something he/she will also believe that those who do
not believe what he/she believes, fail to believe something that is deep and vital. And he/she must
consider himself/herself as privileged with respect to others.

Plantinga takes up the next charge for analysis that an exclusivist is arrogant or egoistical,
arbitrarily preferring his/her way of doing things to other ways. He says that in respect to a belief
in the face of objections there could be three choices: i) one continues to hold one’s belief; ii) one
withholds it believing neither that nor its denial, and iii) one accepts its denial. According to
Plantinga among the three choices whatever choice one makes will beget the same aforesaid
charges. If one denies the exclusive beliefs as per the third choice his/her condition will be the
same as his/her acceptance of the first as Plantinga explains below.
He/she will believe many propositions others do not believe and he will be in condition C with respect to
those propositions explicitly accepted by those of other faiths. He/she will not know any arguments that can
be counted on to persuade those who do believe those exclusive propositions accepted by the adherents of
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other religions. And he/she is therefore in a condition of believing propositions that many others do not
believe and furthermore he/she is in condition C. 29

Thus he elucidates that if, believing some exclusive claims is sufficient for intellectual arrogance
or egotism, the same is also true with denying those claims.

Plantinga further analyzes the second choice taken by pluralists like Hick. One can
withhold the proposition in question because one could not convince others of what he/she
believes. Thus one believes neither these propositions nor their denials. In other words, the pluralist
says to the exclusivist that the right course under condition C is to abstain from believing the
offending proposition and also abstain from believing its denial. Plantinga calls such a pluralist
the abstenmious pluralist. He argues that disagreement is fundamentally a matter of adopting
conflicting propositional attitudes with respect to a given proposition. He explains it in the
following examples.30
There is a proposition P
I believe P
You believe –P

This is a disagreement or contradiction.

I believe P
You withhold it, fail to believe it.

This is an act of dissenting.

As per Plantinga, if contradicting others under the condition C, is arrogant and egoistic, so is
dissenting under C.

29
30
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Let us apply to P : It is wrong to discriminate against people simply on the grounds of race.
You believe P
Many people do not believe P
Recognizing that there are many people who do not agree with you, I do not believe P. And
I do not disbelieve it either because there are people like you who believe P.

Therefore, in such circumstances I abstain from the proposition or belief. According to Plantinga,
by abstaining I implicitly condemn your attitude, your believing the proposition as somehow
improper, naïve, perhaps unjustified or in some other way less than optimal. And I am implicitly
saying that my attitude is superior, even though I am not able to prove to you that your attitude is
wrong or improper or naïve. Thereby, I am guilty of intellectual arrogance.

For Plantinga, the real problem for an exclusivist is that he/she was obliged to think he/she
possessed a truth missed by many others. The problem with the abstemious pluralist is that he/she
is obliged to think that he possesses a virtue others don’t or acts rightly where others don’t. Thus
Plantinga proves that if, in condition C, one is arrogant by way of believing a proposition others
don’t, one is equally, under those reflective condition, arrogant by way of withholding a
proposition others don’t. Moreover, one cannot be arrogant and egoistic just by virtue of believing
what others don’t believe, where one cannot show them that one is right. Plantinga delves still
deeper into the concept supposing that one thinks the matter over, considers the objections as
carefully as possible, and realizes that he/she is finite and furthermore a sinner, certainly no better
than those with whom he/she disagrees; still it seems clear to him/her that the proposition in
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question is true. In such a case too, one is behaving immorally in continuing to believe it. The
following example makes it still clearer. I am sure that it is wrong to try to advance my career by
telling lies about my colleagues; and I realize that there are people who disagree; I also realize that
in all likelihood there is no way I can find to show that they are wrong. In such a case I am surely
doing what is moral by continuing to believe as before. Likewise, if, after careful reflection and
thought, one is so convinced that the right propositional attitude to take toward those exclusive
propositions like (1) and (2) is abstention from belief, one cannot be blamed for egotism.31

There is always risk in believing as well as in withholding all religious or philosophical
beliefs. One can go wrong that way as well as any other, treating all religious, or philosophical
thought, or all moral views as on a par. In particular one cannot reach a safe haven by trying to
take the same attitude toward all the historically available pattern of belief and withholding; for in
so doing, one adopts a particular pattern of belief and withholds one incompatible with some
adopted by others. Plantinga blames those pluralists like Hick for holding the propositions 1 and
2, and yet their colleagues from other faiths while telling literally false, believes still have valid
responses to the Real. And according to him, Hick’s solution is not the solution for the problem,
because the solution sounds like throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Though a religion is a collection of beliefs, rites and rituals, belief is considered to be the
most important one in religions like Christianity. For Plantinga religious diversity is not merely
the diversity of cultural expression of rites and rituals of various sorts, but also diversity in beliefs.
And the awareness of religious diversity is consistent with continuing to believe what one has been
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believing all along. And he says that it is also logical that if an exclusivist believes in something
he/she will also believe that those who do not believe what he/she believes fail to believe
something that is deep and important. Even though all have the same epistemic markers, the same
phenomenology, a believer is convinced that all the various beliefs are not on a relevant epistemic
par. As a believer believes that the Holy Spirit has given different gifts to different people, he/she
must see himself/herself as epistemically more privileged than others. Regarding the pluralist
Plantinga says that when there is an internal parity the pluralist withholds judgment and despite
knowing that many do not agree with his/her position he/she continues to maintain it. Therefore
the pluralist is in the same position as an exclusivist. Moreover, Plantinga concludes that both
believing and withholding involve risk, while treating all religions or philosophical thoughts or
moral views as on a par.32

2.2.

Linda Zagzebski responds to Hick

In the above section we saw Plantinga’s critique on Hick’s solution, on behalf of the
believers. Here in this section, we shall see how Linda Zagzebski in her article: “The Problem of
Religions Diversity”33 understands both Hick’s approach to the problem of religious pluralism and
Plantinga’s critical response to Hick.

Exclusivism for Christianity is one of the main targets of Hick’s attack in his article.
Zagzebski seems to acknowledge that there was exclusivism in Christianity until approximately
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the middle of the twentieth century. She begins her response by presenting her understanding of
exclusivism.

She presents three kinds of Exclusivism, namely, 1.exclusivism about truth,

2.exclusivism about salvation and 3.exclusivism about rationality. 1. Exclusivist about truth holds
that the doctrines of only one religion are true and those of other religions are true as long as they
do not contradict. 2.Exclusivism about salvation holds that one’s own religion is the only path to
salvation. For example, Christians claim that only Christians go to heaven. Buddhists claim that
nirvana can be achieved only through following certain precepts. We may ask why only our
religion is the right path for salvation. Zagzebski reminds us that Plantinga’s answer is that the
Holy Spirit has given the gift of faith in God to some people and not others and therefore, some
people are epistemically privileged. 3.Exclusivism about rationality holds that the teachings of
only one religion are rational. The teachings of other religions are rational as long as they do not
conflict with ours.

According to Zagzebski, fair-minded religious people deny exclusivism about rationality
though they may accept exclusivism about truth. They combine exclusivism about truth with
inclusivism about rationality. As Zagzebski hypothesizes that such people might say, “Our beliefs
are true and the beliefs of other religions are false in so far as they are incompatible with ours, but
the beliefs of many religions are still rational. The people who practice those religions are justified
in believing what they believe, given their circumstances. If we had been born in their
circumstances and had their experiences, we would probably believe what they believe.”34 In such
a position one tries to understand others while not compromising one’s commitment to one’s own
beliefs. For Zagzebski, the problem lies in the combining of both rationality and truth. We want to
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have rational faith because we think there is a close connection between rationality and truth.
Rationality is understood generally as taking us to truth. But in combining exclusivism about truth
and inclusivism about rationality there is a gap. She explains that there can be nine religions
explaining the origin of the universe in nine ways. Though all of them may be rational, at the most,
only one can be true. That leads us to conclude that rationality need not be always truth-conducive.
Thus, Zagzebski shows that there is a problem of gap in combining exclusivism about truth with
inclusivism about rationality.

All religions may agree on some of the fundamental ideas, such as, something is wrong with
human beings as they are but by communing with the ultimate reality we can improve our morality
and reach a higher level of consciousness. On the contrary, religions conflict about particular
beliefs. And Zagzebski finds that religious diversity is a problem for both believers and
nonbelievers with reference to rationality. If we maintain that our beliefs, the beliefs of others and
the beliefs of atheists are rational then, we have no reason to think that one rational belief is
preferable to a conflicting rational belief on the grounds of its rationality. Rationality may be more
truth conducive than irrationality, but one rational belief may not be preferable to another with
respect to truth-conduciveness. However, if we give up our own beliefs because their rationality is
not closely connected with truth, then we all end up with agnosticism. As per Zagzebski, “What
makes it a good thing for humans to be rational is that it puts us in as good a position to get truth
as we can get.”35 Therefore, she points out a danger that if we give up any chance of getting the
truth about any important issue that goes against rationality. Despite her conviction that the
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problem of gap has not been resolved, she concludes two ways to resolve or avoid it, 1.The
Pluralism of Hick and 2.Self-Trust and Religious Belief.

2.2.1. The Pluralism of Hick
Zagzebski summarizes her understanding of Hick’s understanding of the issue. According to
Hick all the major religions offer a means for salvation that transforms humanity from selfcenteredness to reality-centeredness. For him the fruit of transformation is a life of love and
compassion. Since all the religions are productive of love and compassion, all the religions are
genuine paths to salvation. As per Hick, that understanding leads to the metaphysical conclusion
that the salvific ground in ultimate reality is the same in all religions.

Hick uses Kant’s concepts of noumenal and phenomenal worlds to explain that all religions
can have access to the ultimate reality. Noumenal world is the world ‘in itself,’ independent of our
capability to experience it. Phenomenal world is the world of possible experience which “is
necessarily connected with the ways in which it presents itself to our experience, through intuitions
of space and time and through the concepts that permit us to make judgments about it, such as the
concepts of cause and of substance.”36 Based on Kant’s understanding of reality, Hick argues that
we cannot experience God/ the ultimate reality as it is in itself directly any more than we
experience the world of things-in-themselves. Therefore, the possibility of our experiencing the
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ultimate reality is through the experiential and conceptual forms available within our culture. And
such phenomenal world is the only possible world of human experience which cannot be an
illusion, for it is the only way we humans are capable of knowing anything. And further, our
phenomenal world or the world of our experience is related to the world of reality-in-itself. Thus
the world of Hindus, the world of Christians, and the world of Buddhists are distinct phenomenal
worlds which are related to the world of reality-in-itself.

Zagzebski also points out the difference between Hick and Kant is the understanding of the
phenomenal world. According to Kant the phenomenal world is the world which is there to be
experienced by humans, which contains all the objects of experience that are interrelated by space
and time and are also potentially affected by human actions. But Hick’s understanding of religious
phenomenal worlds is not parallel to Kant’s, for they are many and those different worlds of
different religions are like different lenses through which we experience the ultimate reality. In
Kant’s understanding we all humans are naturally equipped with categories to experience the
world, whereas in Hick’s understanding, such need is met by one’s own religion.

Regarding the problem of gap between rationality and truth, Zagzebski claims that Hick
solves it. According to Kant, we humans cannot experience the noumenal world but only the
phenomenal world through the categories of knowledge which are naturally available within
humans. Likewise, the ultimate reality also cannot be experienced as it is in itself, but the world
religions put human beings in contact with religious phenomenal reality through different worlds
of different religions, namely, world views. Since, all the great world religions are capable of
putting us into touch with the religious phenomenal reality, all the world religions are rational and
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true. However, Hick points out that there are two transhistorical truth claims of religious teaching
that do not fit the Kantian model, namely, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and the doctrine of
reincarnation. One religion teaches that God created everything out of nothing, whereas another
teaches that the material world is eternal. While one religion teaches that after death human beings
get incarnated, another teaches that your body will be restored some day and your soul will rejoin
the body in a resurrected life37, and yet another religion (Hinduism) teaches that you will be
annihilated as a human person in order to be assimilated into something else. All these are mutually
contradicting claims; accepting one will deny the other. And all their differences cannot be
explained in reference to different religious phenomenal worlds. Along with those transhistorical
claims, there are also historical beliefs which Hick judges unfit within the Kantian model. For
example, Jesus either raised Lazarus from the dead or he did not; Jesus either rose from the dead
or he did not. There is no different way of understanding such historical beliefs. Moreover, Hick
does not have a problem treating such historical beliefs as well as incarnation as myths, because
he believes that a true myth can also evoke the response of transforming a person from selfcenteredness to reality-centeredness.
There are three problems in Hick’s position pointed out by Zagzebski.
1. If Hick takes each phenomenal world to be a real one, then Hick is a polytheist. Strictly
speaking in a Kantian sense, for Zagzebski Hick is a phenomenal polytheist and a noumenal
mono-something, because he does not call the ultimate reality ‘God’. On the noumenal
level Hick’s stand is parallel to negative theology in which God is indefinable,
unqualifiable, uncategorized. Therefore Zagzebski finds Hick’s position to be a
combination of polytheism and negative theology.

Cf., Dogma of Catholic Faith in Nicene Creed: “I believe in the forgiveness of sin, the resurrection of the body,
and life everlasting…..”
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2. Hick’s pluralism threatens religious commitment. It might lead a believer to think that the
connection between one’s religious doctrine and truth is very weak, as his/her religion does
not stand out in the face of other religions’ understandings of the nature of the universe and
one’s relationship to that universe. Pluralism also undermines the belief that the universe
had a personal creator who providentially guides the temporal world, hears prayers and
responds to them. The idea of the almighty as an impersonal force makes one’s faith
groundless.
3. Hick’s separation of salvific beliefs that are phenomenal manifestations of ultimate reality
from historical beliefs and transhistorical beliefs about the origin of the universe and the
afterlife are not compatible. It was shown above that Christian beliefs in the ultimate reality
always include the historical beliefs about the Incarnation, the Redemption, and the
Resurrection.

2.2.2. Self-Trust and Religious Belief

The problem of the gap between reality and truth arises from the perspective external to the
self. All religions are rational, and therefore there is an intellectual egalitarianism from the external
viewpoint. Belief is not completely external to the self but internal. If we look at others’ beliefs
the same way we look at our beliefs then there can be no one with an epistemically privileged
position. In such a case, we are bound to end up in skepticism about all except a very few beliefs
which are not enough to base a worthwhile life upon. Therefore, Zagzebski recommends that we
need a substantial degree of self-trust and in the forces that have shaped one into a person to live
a life with energy and purpose. And she says that any normal life will depend on self-trust in our
intellectual faculties, procedures, and opinions. All these factors work in collaboration to ascertain
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the truth of a matter. We test a memory by perception, we test perception by another perception,
and we test most of what we believe by consulting other people or by comparison with the
testimony or opinion of others. Thus, for Zagzebski, a belief is a refined product of a process and
that belief also helps to test other new beliefs.

Zagzebski further develops her point, saying that our emotion is an important element of selftrust and this trust in our emotions is also accompanied by the faculties, procedures and opinions.
The grounds for trusting our emotions are similar to the grounds for trusting our perceptions and
beliefs. And trust in the beliefs that lead to action requires emotional self-trust. For example, my
belief that I ought to escape a situation is often grounded in the emotion - fear. Zagzebski says, “If
I trust the belief, I must trust the emotion. So, epistemic self-trust requires emotional self-trust.
Both emotional and epistemic self-trusts are compatible with revising what we trust, but it takes
self-trust to trust that the process of revision is trustworthy.”38 Among the emotions Zagzebski
identifies admiration as unique, for it does not have other emotions as its parts. She further adds
that the admirable is something that is attractive which means that one feels positive emotion
towards the person one admires and such admiration might lead the person to imitate what is
admirable given the right practical conditions. As per Zagzebski, attraction and desire to imitation
are intrinsic to admiration.

She explains the relation between emotion and admiration, saying that a person’s trusting
his/her emotion of admiration may lead him/her to trusting the beliefs of the admired one more
than trusting his/her emotion of his/her own beliefs, as when the other person may form his/her
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belief in a more admirable way; the other person is very much like one’s present self but with more
experience. This proves that an individual varies in trusting his emotion of admiration for different
people. Therefore, it rejects intellectual egalitarianism. But then this adaptation process is not as
easy as it may sound. Zagzebski says that one adopts the belief of the other person easily when
one could do it without necessarily changing anything else about oneself. That leads us to another
important factor with regard to the existentiality of a belief in a person. A person’s belief is not a
simple isolated factor but a complex factor that is intermingled with most of the aspects of a
person’s life. If a belief in the admirable is in conflict with the admiring person’s belief which
he/she trusts, imitation becomes very hard. In such a situation one is faced with a conflict with
self-trust. The conflict is between the self-trust that I trust my belief and the self-trust that I trust
the emotion of admiration that grounds my trust in the other person. Zagzebski says that given the
complex nature of a belief, even if one trusts one’s admiration more than his/her belief, it does not
follow that one should adopt the belief of the admirable. Once again she explains that admiration
is an emotion that leads one to imitate the admirable person in suitable circumstances only. For
example, one may admire the Olympic gold medal winners without having any desire to imitate
them. One can also admire the Hindu belief system without intending to adopt it. One does not
adopt any such beliefs because they are not compatible with the self that one is. “Given the social
construction of belief, trusting a belief commits me to trusting both the individual persons from
whom I learned the belief, and the traditions and historical institution upon which I depend to
interpret the belief. Religious beliefs are usually connected to a network of other beliefs, emotions,
experiences, institutional loyalties, and connections with many other admirable people, all of
which I trust.”39
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On conversion, Zagzebski says that an intellectually conscientious person who does not
convert to another religion has greater trust in the social construction of his belief of his religion
than his trust in the admirable person who believes in his/her religion. If one’s trust in the admirable
person is greater than the trust he has in his own, then it would be conducive for conversion. Thus,
her analysis of self-trust concludes that conversion can be compatible with intellectual
conscientiousness. And further she warns, “We should be suspicious of any account of
conscientious belief that has the consequence that radical conversion is never a conscientious thing
to do, and we also should be suspicious of any account of conscientious belief that requires us to
give up the beliefs of others on the grounds that conscientiousness demands an external perspective
on the self.”40 In other words, sometimes the conscientious belief may lead to radical conversion
and sometimes it may not require one to give up one’s beliefs that conflict with the beliefs of others
rules out radical conversion nor adherence to one’s own. Whenever we make a choice of
conversion, some element of self-trust becomes the bottom line to judge between the conflicting
beliefs. As per Zagzebski there is no standpoint outside of the self-trust which determines his/her
decision of conversion. And she concludes that mere admiration need not require one to change
one’s beliefs, but it also adds something important to the dialogue between people with conflicting
religious beliefs. It can give a person the feeling or awareness that one would imitate those beliefs
of others if that person had grown up with a different social construction of the self. Empiricist
philosopher Spinoza would say similarly in his ethical point of view that if someone does
something violently or negatively, we cannot condemn that person because he acted on account of
his background. Even though we think we are right regarding our beliefs, still we would be aware
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that that is not the end of truth. Thus Zagzebski rejects another point about tolerance, saying that
tolerance comes not from thinking that everybody is right, but trusting that we are right in the
admiration we have for many people who have very different beliefs.

Chapter. 3
All Religions Can Live In Peace
In this final section, we shall recapitulate some of the main points from the previous
sections and add some more analysis to be followed by additional comments. In order to
understand Hick’s pluralistic position as a pluralist, we should be aware of some of his
assumptions. He assumes that the society and world at large are divided because of religions. Those
religious conflicts are based on exclusive truth claims of various religions. In particularly he points
out that the truth claims of each religion automatically dismiss the truth claims of other religions
that are not in line with them. Since each religion claim to be the way of salvation, Hick chooses
the concept of salvation to be a common ground for all religions to analyze the impact of each
religion on the human race. He defines salvation as transformation of a believer from his/her selfcenteredness to divine-centeredness. He is aware that this salvation project is practical only when
we are able to observe their fruits in human life. Hick identifies love/compassion as the observable
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fruit of salvation in human life. All religions do agree that love/compassion is the unselfish regard
for others. Since every religion promotes love/compassion to become divine-centered, one might
think that by measuring love/compassion among the believers of different religions, we can
identify the best religion. However, Hick realizes that that does not help to identify the best of all
religions, because all people engage in the acts of love or hate, irrespective of their religious
identities. There is no way of verifying the superiority of any religion through any external means.
Therefore, Hick begins to analyze the relation between the truth claims and their base that is the
divine which he prefers to call the Real. In Kantian terms, he says that the divine noumenon, the
Real an sich, cannot be known in itself; however, it is experienced through different human
receptivities as divine phenomena. And religions play a vital role in the formation of human
receptivities. In Hick’s words, religion with its history, ethos, great exemplars, its devotional and
meditative practices constitute an uniquely shaped colored lens through which we know the Real.
It is a metaphysical impossibility to know anything in itself and it is so with the Real. Therefore,
the intentional objects of worship with particular names as Adonai, the Heavenly Father, Allah,
Vishnu, Siva, Brahman, Dharmakaya or the Void, and so on, are only appearances or
manifestations of the Real, rather than the Real an sich. Since it is a metaphysical impossibility to
know the Real in itself, Hick argues that there is no base for any religion to claim superiority over
other religions.41 Further Hick says that since the Real is ineffable and unobservable, we cannot
deny the transcendental reality like materialists, because denying it would mean that all our
religious experiences are merely constructions of human imagination. And as per him, the doctrinal
conflicts embody different conceptions of the ultimate, and they arise from the variations between
different sets of human conceptual schema and spiritual practices.42 Further, Hick analyzes some
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of the disputed issues on the origin of the universe and the historical discrepancies connected with
different religions and shows that the correct understanding of all those things is not a requirement
for salvation. In the concluding section of his article, Hick focuses on the conflicting truth claims
of religions more specifically, some of the central doctrines of the Catholic Church and he urges
that those conflicting doctrines be reformulated in agreement with other religious doctrines.

Hick’s use of the Kantian model helps him to disprove the claim of superiority of any
religion. Pre-Kantian understanding is that we have direct access to truth of any reality as it really
is. On the contrary, the Kantian understanding is that although there is a noumenal reality, we have
access only to the phenomenon of the reality. In other words, we can understand the truth of the
reality only in respect to the cultural/social/psychological grids though which our
conceptualization of this noumenal reality is processed. According to Alston, in the pre-Kantian
model, an exclusivist is not obligated to face his/her opponent in the absence of any objective
common ground to determine which perspective is right. Agreeing with Alston, Quinn also adds
to that the pre-Kantian model also implies that no contending perspective is correct in its present
form and an exclusivist may adopt a Kantian approach to religious belief. Quinn holds that once
we realize that it is reasonable to assume that the proponent of even a non-religious perspective
has an accurate understanding of divine it is also reasonable for a believer to revise his/her own
phenomenological perspective on the truth in a way to have a greater understanding of it by greater
overlap with the phenomenological perspectives of others. Adding to that, Basinger says that
Quinn’s approach to conflict is becoming increasingly popular in exclusivist circles. And Basinger
gives an example of a flexible understanding of the Biblical account of creation story. The Biblical
account of God creating the world within six twenty-four hours period about ten thousand years
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ago, is understood by Christians themselves in a broader sense: i) Since “a day is to the Lord a
thousand years” the time frame of the creative activity could be understood to have taken millions
of years. ii) Some even accommodate the “Big Bang” theory saying that God could have
orchestrated the “Bing Bang”. iii) Some look beyond the specification of Biblical narration of the
creation story and understand that God is the author of creation.43

Alvin Plantinga responds as a Christian believer. He says that he is convinced that his
beliefs are true and all that are not in line with his beliefs are wrong. He takes up the two kinds of
accusation of the pluralist against exclusivist, namely, the exclusivist is morally and epistemically
arrogant. Regarding the epistemic arrogance of the exclusivist Plantinga responds that the
exclusivist is justified, for he is epistemically favored by God that he has something of great value
which other lack. According to Plantinga, the moral indictment against the exclusivist has no base,
for if the exclusivist is morally oppressive, just because he/she believes what he/she is convinced
of, given the awareness of other religions, genuine piety and devoutness and no knowledge of
arguments that would necessarily contradict them, it is the same case with the pluralist too. Further,
Plantinga says that there are three choices of response with regard to a belief: i) to believe ii) to
refute iii) to abstain. The pluralist seems to take the third choice. According to Plantings, a pluralist
is indirectly refuting the belief by his abstention. Thus abstaining is no nobler than accepting and
refuting. Therefore, pluralist can be attached like the exclusivist. Plantinga concludes that it is
more responsible to believe than abstain from believing.
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There are different opinions regarding examining one’s own beliefs in the face of
contradictions. Some individuals, sometimes called fideists, argue that religious beliefs are not
properly subject to rational assessment of any sort, because they think that such assessment
demonstrates lack of faith. On the contrary, most others agree that the exclusivist has the right to
assess his/her beliefs in the face of religious diversity. Furthermore, Robert McKim would say
“disagreement about an issue or area of inquiry provides reason to think that each side has an
obligation to examine beliefs about the issue.”44 It is human nature to seek the truth, and in order
to maximize truth and to avoid error one needs to attempt to resolve the conflict. According to
Plantinga, a believer has the responsibility to attempt to resolve a conflict if he/she thinks that an
opponent is on equal epistemic footing. However, he denies that Christian exclusivists need to
consider any opponent to be on the equal epistemic footing, because he/she has been epistemically
favored by the Holy Spirit not to err at least in his/her fundamental Christian beliefs. Therefore, a
Christian exclusivist is believed to be in an epistemically favored position than his/her opponents,
as there is no way to demonstrate against it. However, Plantinga acknowledges a similar
epistemically favored position to other exclusivists of other religious systems too. The critics
would argue that the burden of proof is not on the shoulder of the opponents but on the shoulder
of Christian proponent, for he/she needs to prove his/her empistemically favored position on
epistemic grounds that are accepted by all rational people.45 Plantinga’s position does not suggest
solving the conflict between opposite beliefs of different religion. On the other hand, it may lead
us to realize the uniqueness of every religion and that its beliefs are relevant and practical within
their frame. However, it faces the need to maximize truth and minimize error.
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Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski begins her reply to Hick by giving three kinds of exclusivism,
namely exclusivism about truth, exclusivism about salvation and exclusivism about rationality.
Zagzebski warns us of the problem of the gap between truth and rationality if exclusivism about
truth and inclusivism rationality are combined. In that case, particular religious beliefs conflicting
with the beliefs of others will remain a problem. It is a problem not only for religious believers but
also for non-believers, because one rational belief may not be preferable to another with respect to
truth-conduciveness. On the other hand, if both atheists and believers give up their faith on the
ground that their rationality does not lead us to truth, then we all will end up in agnosticism. Further
she says that according to Hick the salvific ground in ultimate reality is the same in all religions.
Hick uses Kantian terms to explain how we get only the phenomenon of the world and the Real
distinctively through the respective religious lenses. Zagzebski finds that Hick in a way, solves the
problem of gap when he recognizes that all religions are capable of communicating the Real to
their respective believers and all are ways to salvation. However, the problem of gap remains in
the issues like the origin of the world and destiny of human beings. Zagzebski also points out a
few problems with Hick’s position: i) In his recognizing of each phenomenal world, Hick is a
phenomenal polytheist and noumenal mono-something; ii) Hick’s pluralism threatens religious
commitment; iii) Hick’s separating the salvific beliefs of phenomenal manifestations of the
Ultimate from historical beliefs and transhistorical beliefs is not compatible with many religions.
From her part she proposes Self-Trust to be the deciding factor regarding one’s religious
conversion.

3.1.

Philosophical Possibilities
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David Basinger suggests an idea of Jennifer Lackey on the role of the self in deciding
between one’s own belief and another person’s belief, saying that the final judgments made by an
individual are based on personal beliefs to which each individual has access. Moreover, one is
epistemically privileged as he/she has greater access to the reliability of his/her own belief-forming
faculties than do his/her opponent. Likewise, Basinger mentions similar thoughts of Ernest Sosa
who speaks of ‘the gulf between the private and public domain’ and Peter van Inwagen who speaks
of ‘incommunicable insight that the others, for all their merits lack.’46 Therefore, in a situation of
conversion, what matters is the individual’s decision, which is very much based on an individual’s
convictions as to which personal beliefs are most plausible.

Religious diversity exists on basic issues. The Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam understand God as a personal deity; Hinayana Buddhism denies God’s existence;
Hinduism of Advaita considers personal deity as illusion; and so forth. Many forms of Christianity
and Islam believe in immortality; on the contrary, Hinayana Buddhism aims at total annihilation
of the self as a discrete, conscious entity. There are also disputes about our knowledge of God,
whether God is the source of human moral behavior, the criteria to enter into heaven, and so on.47
Apart from that, religions also differ in their expression of faith, namely, in their rites and rituals,
and so forth, both these differences are not a matter of concern for us now, but rather conflicting
theological assertions or doctrines. Generally the fundamental beliefs of a religion are the
foundation upon which the worldview, the superstructure is constructed. Therefore, beliefs are
taken more seriously than the expressions. However, the expressions do make an impact on the
observers both positively and negatively. Though India is a secular country, minorities like
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Muslims, Christians, and so on, do fear the Hindu religious processions conducted once a while,
because such procession were causes of religious riots in India. Often these processions are
politically organized and carried out under the garb of religion. For Hick, it is the conflicting
doctrinal or truth claims that is the cause of the division among religions.

Basinger mentions thinner theology and thicker phenomenology. There is one kind of
approach to the problem of religious pluralism whereby the exclusivist gives more importance to
phenomenology than to theology, compromising theological claims in order to solve the epistemic
tension produced by religious diversity. Hick recommends such an approach to solve the conflicts
among religions. On the contrary, Quinn says that it may minimize conflicts but is not the lasting
solution, because even if one is strongly a Kandian exclusivist, he/she would still think his/her
religious perspective is superior or closer to the truth than all other competing perspectives.
Therefore, he says, at some point, a person must either cease to be an exclusivist or choose to hold
belief more tentatively.48

3.1.1. To Be Is To Be Different

To be is to be different. Only my being different from the rest is the base of my being as a
separate entity. To be considered a religion, it needs to be both essentially and accidentally
different from the rest. It is no exaggeration to say that the doctrines of a religion give its identity
an independent entity. If we consider the history of religion, we can imagine that the number of
religions then probably was not as many as we have. For example the Catholic Church was one
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and the same from the time of Jesus, and the first major division came in the 16th century with the
Protestant Reformation. People, who were not happy with the way the Catholic Church existed at
that time, protested and separated themselves from it to form their own church, though the new
has taken many fundamental beliefs from the Catholic Church. Likewise, in different times and
for different reasons many detached themselves from their mother churches and formed religions.
Presently there are numerous divisions among Christians. Any believing community is made up
of human beings and constantly indulges in expanding their knowledge of truth and minimizing
errors. However Hick’s demand for reinterpreting the doctrines of religions is not the solution for
the conflicts among the religious doctrines. Human beings are socially and culturally conditioned.
Since human personalities are socially constructed a person can be better understood only within
his/her background but not in isolation. A religion gives a believer a worldview which is most
fitting to one’s background. We already discussed in the beginning that it is easy for someone to
see the defects of others from within one’s culture. Therefore, one religion cannot dictate that
another religion modify religious doctrines. Similarly, it is not reasonable to expect one religion
to modify its doctrines in line with the conflicting doctrines of other religions.

Any human institution must be dynamic in order to last such as in the way that a living
organism grows steadily. In order to grow, one must allow changes within. The constant activity
of the religion in answering metaphysical questions keeps it relevant and alive. Such animation of
a religion requires openness to the time. This openness is to take in what it does not have and to
give what it has that the world needs. A religion is not required to change its fundamental beliefs.
But if it is open to change in order to embrace truth, that religion can survive or else would be lost
in time. The story of the Catholic Church in correcting its mistake of geo-centrism to helio-
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centrism would be a good example of a challenging moment for a religion. A religion needs to
have humility to acknowledge that it does not possess all truth. In the light of Kantian analysis we
know that a reality can be known in phenomenological level only. Many religions claim to have
received revelation from God. Most likely, revelations are taken as noumena by those respective
religions. Yet what God reveals to the individuals of any religion at a particular time and in a
particular historical context is received with the help of those receptivities formed by the person’s
background. Therefore, what he receives is also only the phenomenon of the revelation. That is
why a religion requires constantly priests and theologians to interpret its doctrines. Logically there
could be different revelations in different times too. All that we require is the awareness that one
religion has truth but is not superior to others.

“Homo sapiens are also homo religious,” says Karen Armstrong.49 Among all beings,
humans are the only ones who could objectify themselves. Humans can ask fundamental questions
and pursue finding answers to such questions. Indeed, they cannot stop asking questions and
expanding their horizon of knowledge and truth. In such pursuit of truth, religion provides humans
with a worldview which accommodates the whole of reality. Pursuit of truth is an ongoing process,
which probably began in some homo-sapiens who ventured it as part of a community. Religion
was born in a shared worldview that addressed the issues of a particular group of people. They
expressed their shared worldview as a community as well as individuals in rites and rituals. Such
worldviews are always conditional, for it is born within an already existing structure, in a particular
geographical setup and time. A worldview primarily embodies the existential conditions of the
community as well as its aspirations. Here, it may be relevant to remember the dictum of
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existentialism, i.e., existence is prior to essence. According to Karen Armstrong, God does not
have a history but the human idea of God has a history, because it has greatly or slightly different
meanings from one group to another at various points of time. Therefore, she says that an idea of
God meant for one generation may not be meaningful to another. She gives the example that ‘I
believe in God’ has no objective meaning but relatively in a context, when a believing community
proclaims it. She is convinced that each generation has to create a particular conception of God
that works for them.50

The thought of religion is born only within the existential condition of a community,
namely, its culture. Steven Cahn says,
Each religion reflects the culture in which it develops, and cultures are not true or false, provable or
disprovable, although one may be richer in some respects than another. Yet a culture is not tested by
arguments, nor are religions. They are less like scientific theories and more like works of art, not adding to
our factual knowledge but enabling many to enrich their response to the challenges of the human condition. 51

In this context, it may be interesting to know something about the five divisions of land in South
India is mentioned in Tolkappiam which is estimated to be 2500 years old. The divisions or the
landscapes are Kurunji, Mullai, Marutham, Neithal, and Paalai. As the landscapes are recognized
by their geographical differences, each has a primary deity who suits the characters of the
respective landscapes. Kurunji stands for hilly terrain inhabited by Kuravars, a kind of nomadic
tribe, hunters, and Kanavar (forest dwellers). Murugan is their principal deity who dwells on the
hills and mountains. Mullai is a pastoral land inhabited by shepherd tribes and their principal deity
is Mayan or Krishnan who himself was a shepherd. Marutham is an agricultural land which is the
most fertile land among the five, which is inhabited by Venthan or Indra, the god of heavens who
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provides rain for agriculture. Neithal is the coastal region, inhabited by fishing tribes, whose
principal deity is Varunan, the god of seas. And Paalai is the dry arid region inhabited by Eyinar,
Maravar and Kallar who are warrior tribes and whose principal deity is Kotravai or Durga, the
goddess of war.52 All the deities in these five landscapes are befit their geographical and cultural
set up. Now in the modern times, these divisions no longer exist, and some of their deities
disappeared and some still thrive. Religions exist as long as they continue to provide a worldview
that helps the believers live their lives meaningfully. This is more or less the vulnerability of
natural religion or non institutionalized religion.

3.1.2. A Religion Is Indeed Superior To Others In Respect To Its Followers

The Catholic Church could be a good example for an institutionalized religion, and in fact
it is known to be the biggest organization in the world. Its supreme head, the Pope is connected to
every member of the Catholic Church. Its doctrines are codified. It is roughly two thousand years
old and it steadily thrives. The Catholic Church seems to functions as a living organism, in the
sense that it has been changing itself to befit the change of time. Since the beginning of the Church
there have been several Councils conducted to respond to the needs of the times. Important
doctrines were the fruits of such major councils. For example, until Vatican Council II (19631965), the liturgy was celebrated in the Catholic Church only in Latin as if God understood only
Latin. And it was also the conviction of the Catholic Church that ‘extra ecclesiam nulla salus’
that is, there is no salvation outside the Church. The Vatican Council II redefined the Catholic
Church’s understanding regarding the non Christians said,
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All men form but one community. This is so because all stem from the one stock which God created to people
the entire earth (cf. Acts 17:26), and also because all share a common destiny, namely God. His providence,
evident goodness, and saving designs extend to all men….The Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is
true and holy in these religions. She has a high regard for the manner of life and conduct, precepts and
doctrines which, although differing in many ways from her own teaching, nevertheless often relflect a ray of
truth which enlightens all men. Yet she proclaims and is duty bound to proclaim without fail, Christ who is
the way, the truth and the life (Jn 1:6). In him, in whom God reconciled all things to himself (2Cor. 5:18-19),
men find the fullness of their religious life. The Church, therefore, urges her sons to enter with prudence and
charity into discussion and collaboration with members of other religions. Let Christians, while witnessing
to their own faith and way of life, acknowledge, preserve and encourage the spiritual and moral truths found
among non-Christians, also their social life and culture.53

This above statement from Vatican Council II shows the openness and flexibility of the Catholic
Church to know and accept truth and goodness wherever they might come from. The opening
statement tells us that Church recognizes the single origin of all peoples, and God is the final goal
for all. Such attitudes sustain a religion. Hick heavily criticizes its fundamental doctrines, and he
urges the Church to reformulate them for they are exclusive. As we have already seen, there is no
basis for Hick to come to the conclusion that the conflicting doctrines must be modified so that all
will be in peace.

One of the accusations Hick has against the Catholic Church is that irrespective of its
openness to recognize the role of other religions, the Church still seems to be mainly the
exclusivist. Hick gives a quote from The Degree on the Missionary Activity of the Church:
All must be converted to [Christ] as He is made known by the Church’s preaching. All must be incorporated
into Him by baptism, and into the Church which is His body….Therefore, through God in ways known to
Himself can lead those inculpably ignorant of the gospel to that faith without which it is impossible to please
Him, yet a necessity lies on the Church and at the same time a sacred duty, to preach the gospel. Hence
missionary activity today as always retains its power and necessity. 54

In short he emphasizes giving up any exclusive claim of the Church. Hick’s pluralism seems to be
an extreme and impractical. Already Zagzebski warned that Hick’s pluralism is a phenomenal
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polytheism, a threat to religious commitment, and not compatible with the central teachings of
many religions. Hick’s position is too idealistic where there can be no entities called religions at
all. His fears regarding the doctrinal conflicts of religions seem to be more of illusions. Ernst
Troeltsch who wrote the book The Absoluteness of Christianity (1901) changed his position on the
Catholic Church later. In his paper in 1923 on ‘Relative Absoluteness’, he says that Christianity is
‘absolute’ for Christians and the other faiths are likewise ‘absolute’ for their own adherents. 55 Ernst
Troeltsch’s position is a practical one, in which every believer and religion is respected and
recognized.

Conclusion
We began with the question, ‘Can all religions live in peace?’ Hick’s answer to the problem
is that all religions must reformulate their conflicting doctrines in order to respect others. Plantinga
counters Hick on behalf of the exclusivist. Linda Zagzebski points out the flaws in Hick’s proposal
and emphasizes the importance of self-trust in deciding on conversion or change of belief.

Paulo Freire in his book Pedagogy of the Oppressed, proposes a relationship between
teacher and students. He says the teacher is a teacher-student and students are students-teachers.
Basically he says that there is always two-way teaching and two-way learning. While the teacher
teaches the students, in return he/she also learns from the students. Similarly, while students learn
from their teacher, they also contribute to the knowledge of the teacher. Paulo Freire calls it a
problem-posing education against the traditional banking type of education.56 The understanding
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of Paulo Freire’s teacher-student and students-teachers method might help us in understanding the
relationship among religions. It is the fundamental right of every religion to claim superiority over
other religions. Such claim can be seen as an existential necessity. However, each religion needs
to be aware that it does not possess the wholeness of truth; therefore it must be also open to learn
those truths that are found in other religions. Here one religion can maintain its superiority but
always with humility learn from others too. Francis Clooney proposes a better analogy for a
complementary pluralism in his book: Hindu Wisdom for all God’s Children. His view is that
religious traditions exist in complementary relationships to one another and as not being able to
flourish if they are rigidly apart. He reminds us that we need one another to remain alive and he
invites all to ‘remember that learning religiously is a lifelong process of interchange, acquiring the
other, losing oneself, putting oneself back together again. We consume reality, and the other seems
to disappear inside us, but we become what we eat, and thus we remain alive, beyond ourselves.
We might even imagine religious traditions to be male and female in relation to one another –
provided we allow these male and female roles to shift and grow as we give and receive, as we
nurture and explore each other’s wisdom.’57

While we deal with the theme of peaceful religious coexistence, we are drawn between two
extremes, namely, absolutism and shallow relativism. Absolutism means clinging to one’s view
only, admiring it like Narcissus, while rejecting others.58 Hick fights against this absolutism. But,
in the process of his fight, Hick ends up with shallow relativism. Hick’s pluralism seems to aim at
uniformity and his appeal to reformulate the conflicting doctrines of religions to attain agreement
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with others seems to ignore the distinctive differences between doctrinal differences of various
religions. It does not recognize the rich diversity of the world in favor of uniformity which sounds
like some kind of utopianism. Uniformity must be the opposite of pluralism. Pluralism makes sense
only when we are different. We do not rule out the necessity of interaction between religions to
learn from each other and correct one’s own views in the face of some new truth from others. On
the contrary, asking a religion to compromise its own doctrines with respect to that of others is
unacceptable. Plantinga would argue that an exclusivist or a believer has every right to believe
what he believes based on his belief that he/she is epistemically privileged to believe what he
believes. Linda Zagzebski would say that one’s belief is personal and depends on his/her self-trust
on her belief which is most close to him/her.

Pluralism acknowledges differences, varieties, and uniqueness in every part of reality. Only
by recognizing the plurality of the world one can see every other part of the reality to be
complementary. If you and I are one and the same, then there is no space between us to know and
learn from each other. Francis Clooney uses a fitting analogy between religions and spouses to
explain the complementary character of religions. He says,
Religious traditions stand in complementary relationships to one another, they do not flourish if kept rigidly
apart; perhaps we need one another to remain alive. If at first we are hesitant in the face of so many religions,
it may help to remember that learning religiously is a lifelong process of interchange, acquiring the other,
losing oneself, putting oneself back together again. We consume reality, and the other seems to disappear
inside us; but we become what we eat, and thus we remain alive, beyond ourselves. We might even imagine
religious traditions to be male and female in relation to one another-provided we allow these make and female
roles to shift and grow as we give and receive, as we nurture and explore each other’s wisdom.59

At this juncture, Swami Vivekananda’s insight might be helpful to work towards a feasible
and practical pluralism which Jeffery Long identifies as ‘deep religious pluralism’. A deep
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religious pluralism “seeks to advance a vision of pluralism that is not bought as the expense of
genuine differences among religious traditions.”60 For such pluralism we require unconditional
openness without prejudices or ulterior motives, to learn from others what I do not have. Swami
Vivekananda, a young sanyasin from India who participated in the Parliament of World’s
Religions at Chicago in 1893, while addressing the issue of religious plurality he expressed his
dissatisfaction about the use of the word “tolerance”. He said the word “tolerance” meant
inequality, for the one who tolerates is obviously greater than the tolerated. Vivekananda says:
“Why should I tolerate? Toleration means that you are wrong and I am just allowing you to live.
Is it not blasphemy to think that you and I are allowing others to live? I accept all religions that
were in the past, and worship with them all; I worship God with every one of them, in whatever
form they worship Him.”61 Thus he emphasized the necessity of acceptance in the place of
tolerance. Vivekananda promoted a kind of ‘radical universalism’ according to which “We’re one,
but we’re not the same.” According to him the world religions are distinct and different not only
in their external forms such as languages, rituals, books, and so on, but also the internal soul of
every religion.62 Further he recognizes that each religion is distinct and has a soul. And he finds
that the core insights of every religion complementing. He says, “I believe that they are not
contradictory; they are supplementary. Each religion, as it were, takes up one part of the great
universal truth, and spends its whole force in embodying and typifying that part of the great truth.
It is, therefore, addition, not exclusion. That is the idea. System after system arises, each one
embodying a great idea, and ideals must be added to ideals. And this is the march of humanity.”63
When the very moment you demand any religion to reformulate its doctrines you are displaying a
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sense of superiority over that religion. Self-examining, recognizing, accepting, and integrating the
truth from others into one’s own are rights of every religion. Our awareness that every religion is
working towards trying to respond to the human desire to know the divine and respond to it
appropriately, and that every religion has partial truth of reality will surely lead one to accept the
other as other and respect the existence of others as complementary to one’s own.
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